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ABSTRACT
This paper develops a multi-agent dynamic model of the commercial aircraft industry and
then uses that model to analyze industry pricing, industry performance, and optimal industry policy.
In the model, firms are differentiated in their products and cost structure, and entry, exit, prices, and
quantity sold are endogenously determined in dynamic equilibrium. Re ecting the focus of the paper,
demand and supply are modeled structurally, while investment is modeled in reduced form.  The
model utilizes a cost model of commercial aircraft production developed and estimated in a previous
paper (Benkard (2000)), and a discrete choice model of commercial aircraft demand to determine
static profits. I find that many unusual aspects of the aircraft data, such as high concentration and
pricing below the level of static marginal cost, are explained by this model.  The model also
replicates the stochastic evolution of the industry well. Many of these properties could not be
explained with a static model. These results provide support for the structural dynamic modeling
approach in general. I also find that the unconstrained Markov perfect equilibrium is quite efficient
from a social perspective, providing only 9% less welfare on average than a social planner would
obtain, but that the Markov perfect equilibrium shifts a substantial amount of welfare from
consumers to producers. Finally, I provide simulation evidence that an anti-trust policy in the form
of a concentration restriction would be welfare reducing with high probability.
C. Lanier Benkard






Industrial policy in the commercial aircraft industry is a subject of recurring debate. Many
previous authors have argued that, due to learning by doing and massive entry costs, the
conventional wisdoms regarding trade and antitrust policies may not apply to the aircraft
industry. However, an analysis of policy alternatives that properly accounts for these prop-
erties requires a signicantly more complex model than has typically been used. The goal of
this paper is to take a rst step in that direction.
More specically, because of strong intertemporal incentives due to learning by doing, the
commercial aircraft industry exhibits features that are not consistent with static optimization.
For example, it is not uncommon to observe prices below the level of static marginal cost,
particularly upon introduction of a new product. Thus, static models are severely limited in
their ability to provide us with a meaningful analysis of the aircraft industry. Since there has
been little progress to date in making dynamic models tractable enough to apply to empirical
problems, in evaluating industry performance and policy alternatives the previous literature
has primarily relied on the predictions of relatively simple theoretical models.
There are two weaknesses of the theoretical approach. The rst is that the models tend to be
quite stylized, not reﬂecting any industry particularly well. The second is that many of their
predictions are ambiguous in practice. Policy prescriptions in theory depend on the exact
parameter values of the model. Both of these shortcomings point to the need for empirical
work to provide a more denitive analysis.
This paper represents a rst attempt at analyzing the aircraft industry using a dynamic
equilibrium model that is estimated consistently from observed data. Since the goal of the
paper is to bring the model to data, the model is tailored to include key features of the
commercial aircraft industry. The model focuses specically on the market for wide-bodied
commercial jets since that market contains a more tractable number of products than the
1commercial aircraft market more generally.1 The wide-body market is also the largest2 and
most prominent segment of the commercial aircraft market. The model allows for closed-
loop strategic interaction between rms that are dierentiated in their products and their
production cost. The structure of the model | including the cost function, the demand
function, and the evolution of the rms' endogenous state variables | attempts to reﬂect
the actual structure of the industry, and the supply and demand systems are estimated
(separately) using industry data in a manner consistent with the underlying dynamic model.
I then insert the obtained parameter estimates into the dynamic model and numerically
compute the equilibrium of this model.
The advantages of this approach are two-fold. First, because equilibrium is not enforced in the
estimation procedures, consistency of parameter estimates does not depend on the particular
equilibrium assumptions made and is therefore robust to a wide set of possible assumptions.
Second, there is no need to solve the dynamic programming problem during estimation, which
greatly reduces the computational burden of the estimation procedures. The disadvantage of
the approach is that, if the equilibrium assumptions are true, then greater eciency could
be obtained in the estimates by enforcing equilibrium during estimation.
I nd that, despite some simplications, the dynamic model predicts many aspects of equi-
librium behavior well, particularly those that have been the focus of the past theoretical
literature. It improves vastly on previous attempts at modeling aircraft industry pricing.
For example, even though observed markups vary over a wide range, the model predicts
both price levels and price movements that are similar to those observed, including many in-
stances of below static marginal cost pricing. The model tends to predict equilibrium prices
and markups that are slightly higher than those observed, but I do not feel that this tendency
is a shortcoming of the theoretical model. Rather it is largely attributable to an arbitrary
dimensional restriction placed on the model for computational reasons. The model also rep-
resents many aspects of the industry dynamics well, generating entry, exit, concentration
ratios, plane value, and plane type distributions that are similar to those observed.
1The term \wide-body" refers to a plane with more than one aisle separating seats. The rst wide-body,
the 747, was introduced in 1969. As of 1997 there are seven wide-bodied jets in the market.
2The wide-body market is largest in value terms but not in volume terms.
2The model is also well suited to a detailed analysis of the industry, including alternative mar-
ket structures and industrial policies. I have considered three alternative market structures,
single-product rms, a multi-product monopolist, and a multi-product social planner. The
results from this comparison suggest that the single-product rm Markov perfect equilibrium
(MPE) is quite ecient from a social perspective, providing only 9% less total welfare on
average than the social planner could obtain. However, relative to the social planner, the
MPE shifts a substantial portion of total surplus from consumers to producers. I also nd
that an unconstrained multi-product monopolist with no threat of entry would lead to large
ineciencies from a social perspective.
I go on to consider an anti-trust policy which places a per se restriction on the highest market
share any single rm may attain. I nd that such a policy would be welfare reducing with
very high probability, particularly hurting consumers.
2 The Commercial Aircraft Industry: Some Background and
Motivation
Total commercial aircraft industry revenue for 1997 was approximately $60 billion, of which
$40 billion is attributable to U.S. producers. In many years commercial aircraft has been
the U.S.'s largest net export, with trade surpluses averaging about $25 billion annually over
the early 1990s. The commercial jet aircraft industry has existed since 1956, but the rst
wide-body (the 747) was not introduced until 1969. Sales of wide-bodies have grown steadily
since then so that in 1997 they accounted for approximately 60% of total industry revenue
(30% of units).
The commercial aircraft industry, and aerospace more generally, has seen much merger ac-
tivity in recent years which has led to increased concentration. For example, since 1980
Lockheed-Martin (which no longer produces commercial aircraft but is a major military pro-
ducer) has absorbed 17 other companies, two of them major aerospace industry players.
3Frequently, though not always, mergers have come about when the future viability of a weak
rm has come into question. The recent Boeing{McDonnell-Douglas merger would likely
have been blocked if this had not been the case. The resulting industry for commercial jets
of more than 100 seats consists of only two major producers.
Finally, commercial aircraft is regarded by many countries as a \strategic" industry, meaning
that its presence is essential to the nation's well-being. As such it has frequently been the
target of industrial policy, most notably in Europe, where government supported eorts at
developing a viable industry suered many failures before nally experiencing success with
the Airbus consortium.
2.1 Dynamic Model Motivation: Commercial Aircraft Pricing
As an example of industry pricing policy, Figure 1 graphs estimates of price [P] and average
variable cost [AVC] for the Lockheed L-1011. The price series shown is a nearest neighbor
smoothed transaction price series constructed from a data set that contained sales prices for
approximately 60% of the units. The variable cost series shown was constructed using data
from Lockheed's annual reports. With the exception of the rst data point which covers two
years, all observations for the cost series are annual averages. It should be noted that due to
incomplete accounting this series contains more error than the price series.3 Also, because
the rst data point covers more than 50 units, it does not show very well that variable cost
for the rst few units produced was much greater than the later second peak in cost that
occurs near unit 160.4 However, even with these faults, the data exhibits the two traits that
I would like to emphasize.
First, note that AVC exceeded P for much of the 14 year period that the plane was produced.
3In particular, costs seem to have been recorded in such a way as to \front-load" the data, i.e., costs in a
given year actually somewhat reﬂect units that were shipped in the next even though some considerable eort
was undertaken to eliminate this feature.
4Using the production data provided by Lockheed, it was possible to make a good estimate of the average
variable cost of the rst few planes. This method suggests that AVC for the rst ten planes was approximately
$220 million per unit, which is about three times the AVC for 1979, where the second peak in cost occurs.
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This example illustrates the need for a dynamic model in order to eectively analyze this
industry. No static model could rationalize the prices that we observe in the data. In fact,
without further knowledge of the industry, a summary inspection of this graph might lead to
the conclusion that Lockheed may not have been acting optimally in both pricing the L-1011
and in remaining in the market so long.
Second, the graph shows that there is much greater variance in cost than in price. This
property is assumed to hold for all products in the market since observed prices exhibit
yearly variance of no more than 10-20% while many authors (e.g., Benkard (2000)) have
shown that, due to learning curves, the rst few planes can be as much as ve to six times
more costly to produce than the one-hundredth plane.
The dynamic model presented below replicates both of these properties. Section 7 also shows
that equilibrium prices for the L-1011 predicted by the model are quite similar to those in
Figure 1, which both lends support to the model and helps to explain why this kind of pricing
behavior may in fact be optimal in certain circumstances.
53 Previous Work
Learning curves have been found to be important in many industries,5 and there is a large
literature documenting learning curves in aircraft production (e.g., Wright (1936), Alchian
(1963), Asher (1956), Gulledge and Womer (1986), Benkard (2000), et al.).
The theoretical literature on competition with learning curves is comparatively sparse, but
it does provide signicant insight into industries with learning, specically that learning
curves can provide strong strategic incentives to rms. Several authors (Fudenburg and Ti-
role (1983), Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1988), Cabral and Riordan (1994), et al.) have shown
that learning curves can lead to pricing below the level of static marginal cost, high industry
concentration, and aggressive competition even when industry concentration is high. Stylis-
tically, all three of these properties have been exhibited by the commercial aircraft industry
at one time or another.
Fudenburg and Tirole (1983), show that in a duopoly with learning the link between current
price and current cost is very loose. Specically they show that as rms work down their
learning curves, prices may actually rise. Cabral and Riordan (1994) show that in a duopoly
with learning there is increasing dominance, i.e., there is a tendency for the rm with lower
costs to increase its lead. This paper is more in the spirit of Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1988),
which considers the evolution of an industry's structure, industry performance, and optimal
policy. They show that when learning is strong, an oligopoly with learning may tend toward
monopoly, an unrestrained monopolist may be socially preferable to any market with more
than one rm (supporting restrained anti-trust policy), and that it may increase a country's
welfare to protect an infant industry.
However, the theoretical learning models are quite specialized, making it dicult to apply
them to any specic policy question for a specic industry. Fudenburg and Tirole (1983),
Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1988), and several other authors cover the cases of Cournot and
5Argote and Epple (1990) cover over 100 studies documenting learning curves in many widely varying
industries including both manufacturing and services.
6Bertrand oligopoly. Cabral and Riordan (1994) utilize a more general price-setting dier-
entiated products duopoly. Furthermore, many of the models' predictions are ambiguous in
practice, and even in cases where these models predict an unambiguous outcome, it can be
dicult to tell the magnitude of the eect. Thus there remains a gap in the literature between
the empirical models that document the existence and extent of learning and the theoretical
models analyzing oligopolies with learning. This paper attempts to bridge this gap. In the
model presented here the key features of the theoretical learning models are retained, but the
parameters of the model are estimated econometrically.6
The model used here also relies heavily on recent advances toward the development of an
empirical framework for dynamic oligopoly models put forward by Ericson and Pakes (1995).
Ericson and Pakes (1995) introduced a class of multi-agent dynamic models that can be solved
computationally and are well suited to a variety of empirical problems. Gowrisankaran and
Town (1997) also apply a model of this type to the hospital industry. Contrary to the learning
literature, the currently existing models in this class contain only static pricing equilibria.
Learning curves have the consequence that current prices and quantities inﬂuence future
costs, and hence that dynamic equilibrium is not consistent with either static price-setting
or static quantity-setting, the two examples that have been used in previous models of this
type. The dynamic model presented here is similar to the Ericson-Pakes class of models
in its use of dynamic equilibrium in a multi-agent setting. But, prices and quantities are
endogenously determined in a dynamic quantity-setting equilibrium in the tradition of the
theoretical literature on learning curves.
4 The Model
This paper essentially adapts the theoretical learning models from the literature to an em-
pirical framework similar to that of Ericson and Pakes (1995). The Ericson-Pakes framework
6Baldwin and Krugman (1988) is also somewhat similar in spirit to this paper except that they calibrate
their model rather than estimate it. This allows them to use a much simpler single-product duopoly learning
model similar to those used in the theory literature. They also solve their model for an equilibrium with
precommitment (meaning that the equilibrium is not subgame perfect).
7was used because it is easily expanded to cover a variety of empirical dynamic problems and
because it facilitates computation of the model equilibrium. However, the specic model
used here diers from Ericson-Pakes quite substantially in that prices and quantities are en-
dogenously determined in dynamic equilibrium, rather than being a by-product of the spot
market. Additionally, in order to make the model rich enough to match observed data the
model contains several exogenous state variables.
The model describes an innite-horizon discrete-time industry with endogenous entry, exit,
and quantity-setting, where rms choose strategies in order to maximize the expected dis-
counted value [EDV] of their net future prots given their information set. Prices are endoge-
nously determined through a dierentiated products demand system. Investment in product
quality is modeled in reduced form.
In this model, industry structures are represented by states that summarize all currently
available information relevant to current and future payos. Each active rm is assumed to
have three state variables, its experience level (with respect to the learning process), and two
state variables representing the quality of its product described in more detail below. There
is also one industry-wide state which determines the overall level of demand in each period.
Firms' quality states and the aggregate demand state evolve exogenously according to xed
Markov transition matrices. These Markov processes represent reduced forms for invest-
ment and aggregate demand respectively. The rm's experience state evolves endogenously
according to a Markov process that depends on its own value last period and last period's pro-
duction. The specication used is the one introduced by Argote, Beckman, and Epple (1990)
and used in Benkard (2000), which allows for the hypothesis of organizational forgetting but
encompasses both learning models:
Et = Et−1 + qt−1 and E1 =1 ( 1 )
Et is the rm's experience at time t, qt is the rm's production in time t,a n d is the periodic
retention rate for experience. If  = 1 then the traditional learning specication results, while
80  <1 results in organizational forgetting. This relationship is discussed further in section
6.1.
The dynamic model consists of three stages within each period, with exit, output choice and
entry, and production occurring in order. At the beginning of each period, rms simultane-
ously make their exit decisions. They each observe their potential scrap value, jt,w h i c h
they receive if they choose to exit. Firms exit if their continuation EDV from remaining in the
industry is less than jt. After the exit phase, conditional on the entrant's entry policy the
remaining incumbents simultaneously make their production decisions. Given the production
choices of its competitors, each rm's current production determines both its current prot
and the evolution of its experience.
This model has quantity as the strategic variable for several reasons. Aircraft producers
x their production schedules a year or more in advance, and even with that lead they are
constrained as to how much they can change production rates from past levels.7 Hence, in
the short term aircraft producers are clearly capacity constrained. Aircraft contracts result
from complex bargaining arrangements that usually specify both quantity and price, so the
commercial aircraft market is probably not well represented by either a price-setting or a
quantity-setting game. However, the existence of strict capacity constraints set in advance
seems to indicate that quantity is the primary strategic variable. Baldwin and Krugman
(1988) also come to this conclusion.
Simultaneously with the production choices, one potential entrant observes what quality
state it may enter at and the development cost it will have to pay in order to enter with
that product. If the entrant pays its development cost draw, then it will enter and begin
production in the next period. It is assumed that the entrant cannot produce in the period
in which it enters, which is assumed to be the development period. It always enters at the
lowest experience level E =1 .
7Constraints in changing production rates are partly technological, since increasing production rates can
require some reorganization of the plant. However, the most important constraint is work force training. Due
to the learning curve it can take a year or two for new workers to become fully productive. The length of
training period signicantly limits aircraft rms' ability to increase production rates.
9The last stage to take place within each period is production. All incumbents that chose not
to exit produce the quantities chosen in the second stage and receive prots. An individual
rm's current-period prot is a function of the product qualities for all active products, the
quantity produced by all active rms, its own current experience level, and current-period
aggregate demand. Prices are determined by the inverse demand function while marginal
cost, which is assumed to be constant within the period, is determined by the cost function.
The cost function also includes a xed cost. The demand and cost functions are discussed
below.
The equilibrium concept used is symmetric Markov perfect nash equilibrium [MPE], where
the strategy space includes the quantity, entry, and exit decisions. MPE, as dened by Maskin
and Tirole (1988), picks out those subgame perfect equilibria where actions are a function
only of payo relevant state variables, and thus eliminates many of the vast multiplicity of
subgame perfect equilibria that would normally exist in this type of model. Firms maximize
their EDV of prots conditional on expectations about the evolution of present and potential
future competitors. Equilibrium occurs when all rms' expectations are consistent with the
process generated by the optimal policies of their competitors.
The next two subsections discuss some more technical aspects of the model including some of
its theoretical properties and its computation. Some readers may at this point wish to skip
to section 6, which discusses the estimation and parameterization of the model.
4.1 Value Functions:
The model as outlined above results in the following Bellman's equations for incumbent rms:




















10where i is the rm's own state triple (fEit; it; itg); s is the industry structure, a vector
containing the number of rms at each possible state triple; M is the aggregate market size
common to all rms; q is the vector of quantities chosen by each rm; and it is the rm's
exit value.
Entrants' Bellman's equations are similar:





















where k is the type of rm entering, xe
k is the random entry cost; ie
k is the entry state; and
e(ie
k) is a vector of zeros with a one in the ie
k
th spot, and qi = 0 (the entrant produces nothing
in the entry and development period).
4.2 Computation of the Model Equilibrium
Proof that equilibrium exists for this model is straightforward and is essentially identical
to the proof in Ericson and Pakes (1995) altered to include a random entry cost.8 It is
not possible to solve for the MPE of the model analytically. However, the equilibrium can
be solved for numerically on the computer. In particular, Pakes and McGuire (1994, 1997)
provide two computational algorithms that can be adapted to solve for the equilibria of
dynamic games like this one. The primary algorithm used here is an asynchronous parallel
Gauss-Seidel value iteration algorithm adapted to a game analogously to Pakes and McGuire
(1994).9
The algorithm essentially iterates dynamic programming steps, testing for convergence at
each step. When the value and policy functions do not change very much point-wise between
iterations, the algorithm is assumed to have converged. The algorithm updates each rm's
8Available from the author upon request.
9Pakes and McGuire (1994) use a synchronous Gauss-Jacoby algorithm but their general approach, which
is to use iterated best responses in the stage game, is the same.
11value and policy functions over the entire state space at each iteration and hence must be
performed conditional on a maximum number of rms, N, in the industry in order that
the state space be nite. The algorithm is not guaranteed to be a contraction mapping.
However, in practice the algorithm has generally converged to an equilibrium. Though non-
convergence is not necessarily evidence against the existence of an equilibrium, convergence
of the algorithm is sucient for the existence of an equilibrium for a specic parameterization
of the model.10
A more dicult problem than non-existence is that of multiple equilibria. This problem is
handled in part by looking for equilibria that satisfy several \nice" properties. The most
important property imposed is a weak form of symmetry, i.e., two rms that are at identical
states and are identically situated (with the same set of competitors) are restricted to follow
the same strategies. This form of symmetry is not a restriction to the model as it was
described above. Rather, an equilibrium in which this weak symmetry did not hold would
require additional state variables that essentially serve to label rms so that each rm knows
what its competitors' policies are at every state. The symmetry assumption renders rm
labels irrelevant and serves to reduce the set of equilibria.
I tested for the existence of multiple symmetric equilibria in two ways. First, attempts were
made to solve for dierent equilibria by starting the solution algorithm from random starting
locations.11 Second, in order to test if the algorithm was somehow selecting a particular equi-
librium, an entirely dierent computational algorithm was used to solve for the equilibrium
of the model.12 Using these two techniques, no case was identied where there was more
than one symmetric equilibrium of the kind described above.
In the process of working with this model, several advances to the algorithms have been
made that allow for more rapid calculation of the equilibrium. These primarily include
adaptations that allow for asynchronous computation of equilibria in parallel. The model
10To be precise, convergence of the algorithm is sucient for the existence of an -equilibrium.
11In the interest of saving time, these tests were run on a version of the model in which the computational
burden was slightly reduced.
12The second algorithm used stochastic approximation based on Pakes and McGuire (1997).
12as parameterized in section 6 currently requires 100 CPU-days to solve on a Sun Ultra 400
processor, depending on the exact parameterization and the associated convergence problems
encountered. Ecient parallelization of the solution algorithm divides the run-time essentially
by the number of processors used, reducing computation to a more reasonable time-frame.
However, the computational burden of solving a dynamic game of this magnitude is clearly
massive and cannot be overlooked. While it is the intention of this paper to show the value
of the dynamic approach to economic problems of this sort, despite many theoretical and
technological advances in recent years, the computational burden of the approach remains
clearly its biggest obstacle.
5 Data
In estimating the parameters of the dynamic model, I rely on a wide variety of industry
sources. They are discussed in order below.
5.1 Cost Data
This paper relies heavily on the data set obtained by Benkard (2000) for production of the
Lockheed L-1011. This data set contains labor requirements per unit for 238 of the 250
L-1011's produced between 1970 and 1984. The data refers to direct man hours incurred
by Lockheed itself in the production of each plane including detail fabrication in Burbank,
Burbank assembly, Palmdale nal assembly and ﬂight test. Unfortunately, at the present
time very little data (annual reports, newspaper articles etc.) is available to document the
cost of other inputs to production such as capital investment and materials.
Additional data was obtained from the 1995 edition of the Jet Airliner Production List Vol.
2 that lists each plane's model, serial number, and entire ownership history including rst
ﬂight date, which is taken to be the plane's date of production.
13With these two data sets, it was possible to compile the production schedule and sales pattern
of the L-1011 across time and models. Please see Benkard (2000) for a more detailed discussion
of the L-1011 labor cost data.
The remaining L-1011 cost data was gleaned from Lockheed's annual reports, which contain
very detailed data on yearly development costs as well as initial tooling. Lockheed also
reports \Standby Production Costs" in years of low production, which was used to estimate
Lockheed's xed costs in production of the L-1011.
5.2 Demand Data
The annual ﬂeet and deliveries data used in the demand estimation comes from Boeing's
World Jet-Airplane Inventory Year-End 1993 with supplemental information for 1994 that
came from the continuation of that publication published by Jet Information Services. Air-
craft characteristics come from various years of Jane's All the World's Aircraft.
Key to estimating the demand system is relating prices to the exact set of characteristics for
each plane. Since individual planes diered signicantly with respect to equipment, for each of
the eight wide-bodied planes oered over the time period 1969-1994 I chose the yearly modal
plane in terms of model and equipment (primarily engine type). Then, using a transaction
price dataset provided by Avmark and the characteristics data from Jane's, I constructed a
series of modal characteristics matched to the average price for that set of characteristics for
each plane in each year.
6 Parameterization of the Model
This section discusses the estimation and parameterization of the model using industry data.
Where possible, all parameters were estimated econometrically. The remaining parameters
are matched to observed data. Units are 1994 million dollars throughout.
146.1 Cost Function
A goal of this paper is to match the industry model to the commercial aircraft industry
as closely as possible. The cost structure of the industry drives much of the interesting
strategic behavior that we observe among aircraft producers. Therefore, in specifying the
cost function for the industry model it was critical to work with data that came directly from
the commercial aircraft industry, rather than using more widely available military production
data. Much of the work toward that end was accomplished in a previous paper (Benkard
(2000)). I do not go into as great detail here, but rather direct readers to that paper in the
event that they desire further clarication or technical detail.
Benkard (2000) lists the assumptions needed to derive the following labor requirements equa-
tion:
lnLit =l nA +  lnEt + γ lnSt + it (6)
where Lit is the labor input per-unit; A is a constant; Et is experience; it is a plane-specic
productivity shock; and St is line-speed, a measure of the current production rate.
Many authors have estimated similar learning curve specications to (6) using data from
countless other industries and dening experience as cumulative production (Et =
Pt
i=0 qt).
I refer to this specication as the traditional learning curve because a similar specication
was originally applied by Wright (1936) in the rst published paper recognizing the existence
of learning curves. The main contribution of Benkard (2000) is to show that, due to high
variance in output rates for commercial aircraft production, the traditional learning curve
does not explain costs for commercial producers particularly well. However, a similar learning
model that incorporates the hypothesis of organizational forgetting ts the data extremely
well, while simultaneously providing a very satisfying economically intuition as to why this
might be.
In the organizational forgetting model, experience evolves as follows. At time t−1a r mh a s
15a stock of experience Et−1. The rm then chooses its current production rate qt−1. Between
periods t−1a n dt, the rm's existing stock of experience depreciates by a factor , while new
experience equal to qt−1 is acquired. This process is summarized by the following equation:
Et = Et−1 + qt−1 and E1 =1 ( 7 )
The specication described in (7) is also very intuitive. Production experience in the aircraft
industry is embodied in the actual workers. It refers to the workers' ability to perform their
tasks eciently. Hence, an aircraft producer's stock of production experience is constantly
being eroded by turnover, layos, and simple losses of prociency at seldom repeated tasks.
When producers cut back output, this erosion can even outpace new learning, causing the
stock of experience to decrease, as was the case in the dataset presented in Benkard (2000).
In that event, production costs will rise. To reduce costs back to their previous levels, pro-
ducers must maintain higher production rates for a long enough period that experience gains
outweigh declines, and the former experience level is reached again. Another intuition exactly
analogous to the depreciation story of equation (7) is that recent past production should be
more important in determining current production costs than distant past production. For
a plane like the 747 that has been produced for almost three decades, it is hard to imagine
that production in the early 1970's is much of a factor in current production costs. In the
traditional learning model, all production experience is treated equally regardless of how old
it is. Please see Benkard (2000) for a complete discussion of the organizational forgetting
model in general as well as in the context of aircraft production.
6.1.1 Cost Parameters
Figure 2, derived from the results in Benkard (2000), shows the actual labor requirements of
the Lockheed L-1011 versus the tted equation (6).13 Note that the data does not monotoni-
cally decrease as  = 1 would imply, but instead contains two turning points. As discussed in
13The labor requirements equation is estimated using GMM with a non-parametric heteroskedasticity and
autocorrelation consistent (HAC) estimator for the weighting matrix. This technique was developed by An-
drews (1991) and is described in detail in Benkard (2000). The tted equation shown in Figure 2 also accounts
16Benkard (2000), the organizational forgetting model captures these two turning points almost
perfectly.
This near-perfect t of the cost system is very important to the overall dynamic model since
it is believed that the learning/forgetting dynamics are the most important factor driving
strategic interaction in the aircraft industry. Thus, capturing this aspect of the problem so
well should be expected to translate into better overall results.








































The monthly retention rate of experience () is estimated in Benkard (2000) to be 0.960 with
a standard error of 0.003, corresponding to the annual rate of 0.613 listed in Table 1. The
hypothesis that  = 1 is therefore strongly rejected. The implication here is that an aircraft
producer loses about 40% of its previous stock of experience every year. This number may at
rst seem high, since the forgetting is believed to be driven by labor turnover and company-
level turnover rates do not approach this level. However, there is evidence to suggest that
position-level turnover rates may in fact be this high due to a unique contract structure with
for the fact that there was more than one model of L-1011 produced by allowing for incomplete spill-overs of
production experience between models.
17the aircraft workers union (IAM). See Benkard (2000) for an elaboration.
Table 1: Cost Parameters
Parameter Explanation Value
 Depreciation of Experience 0:613
(0:023)
A Labor Cost Intercept 7:73
(0:01)
 Learning Parameter −0:63
(0:03)
(Implied Learning Rate) 36%
W Wage Rate $20 / hr
FC Fixed Costs $200 Mil / yr
TCF Total Variable Cost / Labor Cost 6:0
TCC Total Variable Cost Intercept 36:2
Cost/Plane-Size Ratio 1:0
xl
1 Lowest Entry Cost for Type 1 $2.5 Billion
xh
1 Highest Entry Cost for Type 1 $3.5 Billion
The implied learning rate with respect to experience is quite rapid at 36%. Note, however,
that the interpretation of the learning rate in this model diers from that of the traditional
learning model ( = 1) since production rates also matter. The learning rate implies that if
experience were doubled, then labor requirements would fall by 36%. Whether or not this
reduction is attainable depends on the current experience level and future production rates.
Since the cost model is estimated on data for the L-1011, some further assumptions were
necessary to calculate costs for other plane types. Specically, production cost is assumed to
depend on the two quality state variables for each rm. For reference, the quality states are
discussed in more detail in the following section.
The unobservable quality state (the unobservable product characteristic jt as estimated
in the demand system | see below) was included in the cost regressions and, despite its
having quite large variance in the sample, it was found not to aect production cost, so that
assumption will be maintained in the cost function. Note that the unobservable portion of
18product quality may be most representative of characteristics like suitability to the current
airline route network, which would not necessarily inﬂuence marginal cost.
Unfortunately it was not possible to estimate the impact of the observable quality state (the
observable product characteristics jt as estimated in the demand system) on cost since the
cost data only covers one plane and, as is typical, the observable characteristics had very
little variance in the data for this plane. However, based on materials inputs alone it is quite
obvious that larger planes have higher costs in relation to their size. Therefore it seems logical
to assume that the variable cost of a larger plane is greater than that of an L-1011 in exact
proportion to its relative size.14
The wage rate was set equal to the wage rate for aircraft workers in 1994 and then total
variable cost from Lockheed's annual reports was regressed on total labor costs to obtain the
two variable cost parameters. Fixed costs are assumed to be constant across plane types and
were also estimated using annual reports. Development (entry) costs are assumed to scale up
with size similarly to variable cost, and were based on Lockheed's development costs.15
6.2 Demand System
Demand for commercial aircraft is very complex, and estimating the demand for aircraft is a
formidable research agenda in itself. Therefore, in modeling aircraft demand the goal was to
nd a model that is theoretically appealing and t the data well, without adding greatly to
the computational burden of the dynamic model.
The most important feature of aircraft demand that dierentiates it from standard discrete
14Here I measure the size ratio as the average between the ratio of seats and the ratio of volume. Volume
ought to give a good measure of relative capital and materials inputs, but seats should be a better measure of
relative labor input.
15Lockheed developed the L-1011 at a cost of $2.52 billion. However, industry sources agree that the biggest
structural change in the aircraft industry in the last 20 years has been the escalation of development costs.
Hence, the Lockheed gure was chosen as a lower bound for the entry cost distribution.
Note also that modeling entry costs as similar in magnitude to those experienced by a current aircraft
producer amounts to assuming that potential entrants are current aircraft producers. This seems like a
reasonable assumption in view of the fact that the only outside entrant into the industry in the last thirty
years was the Airbus consortium, which was funded by several European governments at great cost.
19choice frameworks is that aircraft are durable goods. Therefore, rather than modeling aircraft
purchases as occurring only at the time of a transaction, I assume that each airline optimally
reallocates its entire aircraft ﬂeet each year, choosing from all available new and used planes
at the going market prices. This assumption, which amounts to treating aircraft purchases
as rentals, relies on the fact that the market for used commercial aircraft is very ecient so
there is little cost in conducting a transaction.16
I model yearly aircraft demand using a standard characteristics based approach. I use a
nested logit discrete choice model with several observable characteristics (number of seats,
number of engines, etc) and one unobserved characteristic, similarly to Berry (1994). The
unobserved product characteristic represents the unobservable aspects of an aircraft's quality,
such as reliability, or suitability to current route structures, and is estimated using the data.
By construction, with the addition of the unobserved product characteristic the demand
model ts the data exactly.
There are two groups (nests) in the model, one that includes all new planes in the market,
and one that includes only the outside good, which is dened to be all new narrow-bodied jet
planes and all used jet planes. Individual aircraft purchases are assumed to be independent
decisions even if undertaken by the same airline. This assumption is not likely to hold.
However, relaxing it has proven to be quite dicult and the literature on multiple discrete
choice is sparse, so I maintain that assumption here for lack of a better alternative.
The nested logit model is a great improvement over the standard logit model because it allows
for the estimation of a \within group" correlation of utilities. The implication here is that
an airline's preference for each of the new wide-bodied planes is correlated, and that this cor-
relation will be estimated. This correlation allows for more reasonable substitution patterns
than the standard logit model because inside goods (new wide-bodies) are not constrained
to substitute with the outside good in relation to its share as they are in the standard logit
model. Indeed, this feature of the model was found to be important in tting the data well.
16Alfred Kahn, former Chairman of the Civil Aeronautics Board and architect of airline deregulation in the
1980s, once referred to aircraft as \...nothing but a marginal cost with wings."
20Airlines' utility functions thus look as follows:
uijt = xjt − pjt + jt + igt + ijt (8)
where xjt are observed characteristics of product j in period t, jt is an unobserved charac-
teristic of j, igt and ijt are the random group- and plane-specic tastes respectively, and
0    1 is a parameter representing the within group correlation of utilities.
Solving for the aggregate market shares and inverting gives:
jt =l n ( sjt) − ln(s0) − xjt + pjt − (1 − )ln(sjt=g)( 9 )
where sjt is the overall share of good j, s0 is the share of the outside good, and sjt=g is the
within-group share of j. From this equation it is easy to see that the within group correlation
of utilities () is identied by covariation between the within group market share of the good
(sjt=g) and its total market share (sjt).
Utilizing the following moment condition assumption:
E [jt j Zjt; 0] = 0 (10)
for an appropriate set of instruments Zjt, and similar assumptions and procedures to those
used in Benkard (2000)17, consistent estimates of the parameter vector  are obtained.
Instruments used include plane characteristics (and model dummies), the hourly wage in
manufacturing, the number of years a model has been on the market (to proxy learning while
maintaining uncorrelatedness with j), price of aluminum, and dummies for the MD-11 in
1990 and the A310 in 1994, which were years of supply disruptions for those models.
17GMM with an optimal weight matrix.
21Table 2: Demand Function Estimates
Variable Estimate S.E. HAC
Constant -4.81 0.16 0.15
Seats/100 1.10 0.21 0.23
Freighter 2.45 0.24 0.26
#E n g i n e s -0.30 0.53 0.46
Price/100 -2.40 0.21 0.30
MD-11 -0.35 0.49 0.35
L-1011 -0.14 1.39 1.01
B-747 -0.40 0.49 0.42
B-767 -0.61 0.53 0.53
A-300 -0.91 0.34 0.32
A-310 -0.40 0.78 0.71
Last Year Dummy -0.90 0.37 0.38
Trend 0.25 0.43 0.58
 0.23 0.61 0.63
6.2.1 Demand System Estimates
The demand system was estimated for the period 1975-1994.18 A total of eight models
are observed over the estimation period, leading to 98 model-year observations. Parameter
estimates are shown in Table 2. The column labeled \HAC" refers to heteroskedasticity and
autocorrelation consistent standard errors. Robust standard errors were calculated in case
the unobserved product characteristics were serially correlated or correlated with each other.
For the most part the coecient estimates are as expected. \Number of Engines" is a proxy
for fuel eciency since, given plane size, more engines create more drag. \Last Year Dummy"
is a dummy that is one in the last year that a plane was sold.
Only two of the estimated parameters, the within group correlation of utilities ()a n dt h e
price coecient (), are relevant to the dynamic model since the remaining parameters are
aggregated into the two product quality states. The parameter  is estimated to be close
to zero, which means that the within group correlation of utilities is high for this market.
18Parameter estimates including the period 1969-1974 were similar. However, the market was immature
and contained very few products in its rst ve years. The rst wide-body available was the 747 which was
introduced in 1969. It was followed by the DC-10, the L-1011, and the A-300, all of which were available by
1975.
22The implication is that new wide-bodies substitute much more highly with each other than
they do with other types of aircraft. This nding is quite consistent with intuition. Airlines
often play producers against each other in bargaining, seeming to care as much about the
deal reached as which plane they end up purchasing. In addition, with the exception of the
747 wide-bodies are quite highly substitutable with one another in use. The relatively high
standard error on  may be caused in part by the changing nature of the wide-body market
over time as it matured. However, the estimated value of this parameter was found to be
robust to alternative specications, which included changing the time-period of estimation.19
On the other hand, the coecient on price (), is estimated very precisely. Taken together,
the two parameters lead to own price elasticities in the 5-13 range for 1994, which seems
appropriate for this market given the above discussion. These elasticities are also consistent
with Newhouse's (1982) anecdotal accounts of the industry.
6.2.2 Stochastic Processes for Quality
The detailed plane characteristics used in estimation of the demand parameters are collapsed
down to two dimensions for the purposes of the industry model. Those dimensions are plane
type and plane quality. Table 3 summarizes the estimated Markov processes for plane type
and quality.
The rst dimension, aircraft type (jt), corresponds to the observable characteristics of the
plane (xjt previously). In the dynamic model a plane retains the same type for its lifetime.
This assumption simply rules out Boeing turning a 747 into some other type of plane (e.g.
DC-10). Within the context of the model such a large overhaul of the plane's design would be
treated instead as a new product introduction. This assumption also reﬂects actual practice
as none of the aircraft in the data have undergone signicant changes in size. I allow for three
types of planes in the model, corresponding to the three levels for jt in the table. These
three types can be thought of as small (L-1011, A300, etc.), medium (MD-11, A330, etc.),
19In all the specications estimated the standard error on  remained high.
23Table 3: Demand and Other Parameters
Parameter Explanation Value
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and large (747).
The second dimension, plane quality (jt), corresponds to the unobservable characteristic in
the demand system. The plane's quality moves according to a discrete Markov process which
was estimated nonparametrically using the estimated values of jt from the demand system.
In the data (and also in the model), it is this unobserved characteristic that accounts for
most of the year-to-year variance in product quality, since major changes in an aircraft's
characteristics occur infrequently. The estimated Markov process should be viewed as a
reduced form for the outcomes associated with the rm's product-level investment process.
24Finally, planes are assumed to enter at the second highest quality level because that corre-
sponded to the observed entry value for seven of the eight planes in the sample. In addition,
the empirical distribution of plane entry types is used as the entry type distribution, listed
in the table as P(e).
6.3 Stochastic Process for Aggregate Demand
In order to reduce the complexity of the problem, and because the steady growth in market
size was deemed of second order importance relative to business cycle ﬂuctuations, the market
size state variable is de-trended to reﬂect 1994 values. This has the eect of making all the
state variables of the model nite and stationary, which facilitates computation of the model
equilibria,20 but retains business cycle ﬂuctuations in the form of booms and busts. This
market evolution adds interesting dynamics in the organizational forgetting case, where an
extended recession can result in signicant productivity losses.
The Markov process for demand ﬂuctuations (shown in Table 3) was discretized to three
points and estimated nonparametrically using market size data for the complete history of
the commercial jet aircraft industry (1956-1994).
6.4 Other Parameters
Table 3 also lists values for the two remaining parameters of the model. The rm's discount
rate, , was set to 0.925, which corresponds to a standard annual interest rate.21
The scrap value of a production facility is inherently very dicult to measure. However,
20An alternative suggested by several seminar participants would be to allow some growth in the market
that would eventually cease. I have solved for versions of the model with this feature, but found that there
were no qualitative dierences in the results. Thus, in the interest of keeping computational burden to a
minimum this feature was taken out of the model.
21Changes in this value within a reasonable range did not result in signicant changes to the model results.
No attempt was made to estimate this parameter as past results suggest that it is typically not identied in
the data.
25Lockheed does report signicant detail on setup costs for the L-1011 and, in particular, the
\initial tooling" portion of L-1011 development costs was about $1.0 billion. Since much
of this initial tooling is design-specic, and since the scrap value should vary across rms
depending among other things on whether the rm was going to continue producing other
kinds of aircraft,22 the scrap value distribution was chosen to be close to $500 million.
7 Results: Properties of the Equilibrium and Comparison
with Historical Data
The results presented in this section are taken from the symmetric MPE of the dynamic model
with the industry restricted to a maximum of four single product rms. Ideally this restriction
would have been relaxed to the point that it was no longer binding. However, computational
considerations precluded that. As above, the industry structure in each period is summarized
by aggregate demand (Mt), plane type for each active rm (jt), unobserved quality for each
active rm (jt), and experience for each active rm (Ejt). All states are discretized for
the purposes of computing the model equilibrium. See section A for a discussion of the
discretization of the experience state. The model contains a total of 13 state variables and
approximately seven million states.
7.1 Pricing Policies in Equilibrium
7.1.1 Introductory Pricing
Figure 3 graphs the equilibrium price-cost ratios for a newly introduced small (L-1011 sized)
plane with three equal rivals. According to the model, in every state in which a new product is
introduced, introductory pricing is at a level below static marginal cost. There are theoretical
models in the literature that predict below static marginal cost pricing, but to my knowledge
22Most former commercial jet producers have continued to produce military or other smaller commercial
planes.
26this is the rst empirical model to successfully capture this fundamental feature of aircraft
pricing.






























Qualitatively, the introductory price-cost ratios predicted by the model match the industry
well. The predicted price-cost ratios cover a wide range (0.33-0.79), which shows that pricing
depends critically on the nature of the competition. The model predicts introductory price-
cost ratios that are typically lower in three cases (cases 2 and 3 can be seen in Figure 3):
1) when there are more competitors in the market, 2) when incumbent products are higher
quality, 3) when incumbent rms are further down their learning curves. The strongest of
the three eects is the learning curve. The model sometimes predicts high markups in states
where there are many high-quality competitors, if the competitors also have high cost, but
always predicts low markups when there is even one low-cost competitor.
In the past we have only observed entry of new products under conditions where there was
relatively strong competition, so to the extent that introductory price-cost ratios are observ-
able, they have generally been quite low. When the L-1011 entered the market there were
27two competitors, the Boeing 747 and the McDonnell-Douglas DC-10. At this state, the model
predicts a price-cost ratio of 0.49. The actual observed price-cost ratio for the L-1011 in 1972
was very close to this level at 0.48.
7.1.2 Markups
As a measure of how well the model is capturing industry pricing behavior I now compare
the equilibrium pricing policies predicted by the dynamic model with those observed for the
L-1011. This is an extremely rigorous test. The historical price data was used to estimate the
parameters of the demand system but, aside from these parameters, the model contains no
direct information about prices. In the model, prices are generated endogenously through the
equilibrium assumption. Additionally, because demand and supply were estimated separately,
all parameters were estimated without using any information about markups that is contained
in the data. The prices and markups in the model equilibrium are thus generated largely by
the structure of the dynamic model. Note also that observed prices have been shown to be
very dierent from contemporaneous marginal cost, so the near perfect t of the cost system
does not in any way guarantee that prices will be predicted well.
In order to make the comparison it was rst necessary to calculate the closest discretized
industry structures to those that actually occurred, a simple task given the parameter esti-
mates and the observed data. Figure 4 graphs observed price-cost ratios for the L-1011 against
equilibrium price-cost ratios for a small (L-1011 sized) wide-body in the model located at the
industry structures actually observed from 1972-1985.23
Generally, the price-cost ratios predicted by the model are quite similar to those observed.
The two series are very similar in both overall shape and year-to-year variation, and the
model correctly predicts negative markups for most of the period. These results suggest that
the dynamic equilibrium assumption is doing much to capture the inﬂuence of intertemporal
23Computation of the model equilibrium was restricted to four rms. Thus, in calculating the predicted
prices and price-cost ratios for states with more than four rms, I made the assumption that each rm cares
only about its three strongest competitors.
28maximization on current prices. It should also be noted that, while some members of the
press have characterized Lockheed's persistent below static marginal cost pricing as irrational,
this model seems to suggest otherwise.























The most notable discrepancy (see also Table 4) between the two series occurs in the period
immediately after the L-1011's introduction (1973-1975), where the model predicts higher
markups and prices than those observed. I believe that this overprediction is largely at-
tributable to the use of a simplied demand system. The demand system underestimates the
high degree of competition that took place between the L-1011 and DC-10. In the nested logit
model substitution between products is based on the inside share of the products without
separately accounting for the proximity of products in characteristic space. An alternative in-
terpretation is that Lockheed was pricing at a level that was lower than optimal as suggested
by the dynamic model.24
24Recall that consistency of the estimation of the model does not require optimizing behavior on the part
of rms.
29Markups and prices over the rest of the period (1976-1984) are on average correct and fall
within the observed range of prices in almost every year (see Table 4). While markups are not
observable for other aircraft, comparisons of predicted versus actual prices for other aircraft
are universally similar.
Table 4: Predicted L-1011 Prices and Observed Price Range
Predicted Observed
Year Average Average Modal Min Max
1972 99.3 62.6 59.4 64.7
1973 82.5 64.0 58.3 77.1
1974 75.8 60.9 52.9 76.8
1975 71.1 57.2 54.9 58.0
1976 58.6 62.0 55.2 73.6
1977 59.7 57.6 56.9 59.2
1978 58.9 55.5 55.0 63.1
1979 63.4 67.4 42.9 66.5
1980 83.2 67.0 50.4 82.7
1981 70.8 57.6 57.0 86.4
1982 55.8 62.1 57.5 63.2
1983 51.9 63.5* NA NA
1984 54.7 64.2* NA NA
1985 NA** 65.4* 54.0 54.0
* Estimated Sales-Weighted Prices
** Model Predicts Exit
In the past it has been dicult to come up with a model that explains aircraft industry pricing
policies well. Note that any static model would necessarily predict positive markups and thus
overpredict prices and markups for the L-1011 in every period. The only previous attempt
that I know of at modeling the aircraft industry using a dynamic model is Baldwin and
Krugman (1988). Their primary intent was to evaluate the merits of strategic trade policy,
however the pricing policies in a precommitment equilibrium in their model did not reﬂect
observed prices very well. Thus, despite many simplications in the model, the equilibrium
pricing policies predicted by the model are much closer to observed policies than previous
models in the literature. I consider this to be one important contribution of this paper.
Furthermore, the model predicts that the variance in price is much lower than the variance in
cost, and that there is widespread below static marginal cost pricing. Both of these features
30were shown in section 2 to be present in the observed data, and I know of no other empirical
model in the literature that has replicated them.
7.2 Industry Dynamics
The dynamic model also replicates observed industry dynamics well in many respects. Table 5
shows actual (1969-1994) and simulated statistics for the wide-body market. Two simulations
were used to calculate these statistics, one which reﬂects the initial condition for the industry
in 1969 and one which reﬂects the long run invariant distribution. The rst simulation (\I.C.
Simulation") shows statistics from 1000 26-period simulations of the dynamic model with
initial condition equal to the actual initial state of the industry in 1969, i.e., one large (747-
sized) plane. The model generates an ergodic Markov process of industry states, so for long
enough simulations the initial condition is irrelevant. However the observed data corresponds
to a certain initial condition and this condition is likely to aect industry dynamics in the
short run. I do not believe that 26 periods is long enough to exhaust the memory of the
process, so I believe that the initial condition simulation is a better point of comparison for
the observed data than the long run invariant distribution.
However, there are also some statistics of interest which are dicult to collect with any
accuracy from such a short simulation period. For example, since many of the rms that
entered in this period have not exited yet, it would be dicult to compile statistics for rm
value and lifetime distributions without a longer simulation. Thus, for the rm lifetime
and value distributions a much longer simulation of 10000 periods (\Invariant Distribution
Simulation") was used. The statistics collected reﬂect the unique invariant distribution of
states, so the initial condition for the second simulation is irrelevant.
317.2.1 Concentration and Market Size
In both the observed data and the initial condition simulations there are initially few rms
in the market, so initial concentration is very high. Then, as more rms enter, market
concentration falls and stabilizes at approximately the levels represented by the invariant
distribution simulation. The simulated one- and two-plane concentration ratios from the
model thus appear to closely match the observed ratios. Firms in the model are single-
product producers (or, equivalently, rms are setting prices independently across products),
so the model does not make predictions about rm-level concentration ratios.
The total market size distribution generated by the model is slightly smaller than that ob-
served, most probably reﬂecting the articial dimensional restriction in the model used to
limit the computational burden of the problem. Concentration ratios and market size are
closely matched in distribution as well as in mean, implying that the model is also doing
quite well at replicating the underlying stochastic process of industry states.
7.2.2 Product Type, Value and Lifetime Distributions
Table 5 also lists observed and simulated plane type distributions. The distribution of plane
types generated by the initial conditions simulation is very close to the observed distribution.
The high percentage of large planes over the historical period reﬂects the early entry and
continued market participation of the 747. This feature of the data is captured nearly per-
fectly by the initial condition simulation. However, of the three product types, large planes
are also the least likely to enter. Thus, according to the invariant distribution simulations
we should expect to see a market made up of more small planes and fewer large planes in
the future. If the present is any reﬂection of the future, that prediction seems correct. There
have been many entrants in the small and mid-sized wide-body classes, but as yet the 747
has no competition in its class.
Note that these results are in part driven by the fact that the entry type distribution was
32Table 5: Model Simulations and Historical Industry Characteristics 1969-1994
Concentration Ratios:
Observed I.C. Simulation Invariant Distribution
1-Plane 0.44 0.47 0.40
S.D. 0.20 0.17 0.10
2-Plane 0.68 0.75 0.69
S.D. 0.14 0.13 0.11
1-Firm 0.55 { {
S.D. 0.17
2-Firm 0.82 { {
S.D. 0.12
Market Size:
#P l a n e s 4.4 3.5 3.8
S.D. 1.2 0.8 0.4
#F i r m s 3.4 { {
S.D. 0.7
Distribution of Plane Types:
Observed I.C. Simulation Invariant Distribution
Small 0.56 0.54 0.72
Medium 0.23 0.22 0.23
Large 0.21 0.24 0.05
Table 6: Invariant Distribution of Plane Values and Lifetimes
Distribution of Plane Values:
(Invariant Distribution Only)
Median 1027 Min -8593
Mean 832.6 Max 15756
S.D. 4000 % Positive 54.5
Distribution of Plane Lifetimes:
(Invariant Distribution Only)
Median 21 Min 2
Mean 30.4 Max 261
S.D. 29.6
33parameterized to exactly match the observed distribution of entry types, a modeling conve-
nience designed to limit the number of potential entrants each period to one. However, since
entrants can choose whether or not to enter given their draw on product type, the distri-
bution of products generated by the model remains fully endogenous, and should reﬂect the
relative protability of each product type rather than the parameterized entry distribution.
In fact, the invariant distribution of plane types is quite dierent from the parameterized
entry distribution (see Table 3 for comparison), and the invariant distribution reﬂects the
observed data quite closely, while the parameterized entry distribution does not.
Due to incomplete disclosure and the short history of the industry it would be very dicult
to calculate observed plane values.25 However, the distribution of values generated by the
model has several features that qualitatively match the industry. High variance is one feature
that is predicted by the model that is most denitely present in the industry. Some planes
lose a great deal of money, while others are very successful. On the other hand, the model
predicts that a slim majority (55%) of planes in the market are protable, which at least
two (Newhouse (1982), Seitz and Steele (1985)) authors have claimed is not the case, though
both of these publications are now more than a decade old and there is evidence that more
products have been protable recently than were in the past. The predicted median value of
$1027 Million is within a reasonable range, but because program-level data is highly guarded
there is no corresponding observable to compare it to. The model also predicts that the value
distribution has a thick right tail, which seems to reﬂect observation. There are a few planes,
e.g., the Boeing 747, that have been extremely protable.
Product lifetimes in the invariant distribution are very left skewed, with a median of 21 years.
Again there is no corresponding observable to compare this gure to, but based on observation
to date and our knowledge of the industry, the lifetime distribution seems reasonable. Of
course with only 26 years of history and only two aircraft that have exited to date there is
little information in the data that would help to identify the right tail of the distribution, so
we should not expect the model simulations to be too accurate there.
25Most companies do not give any public accounting of development costs, making it very dicult to
determine whether or not the plane broke even in the long run. Furthermore, the majority of wide-bodied
aircraft are still being produced today.
34The product lifetime distribution is driven by the equilibrium exit policy function as well as
the Markov process of industry states. The equilibrium exit policies generated by the model
are also quite consistent with the observed history. For example, while the L-1011 actually
exited in 1986 (dening exit consistently with the dynamic model, 1986 was the rst year
in which zero L-1011's were delivered so it is the year in which Lockheed exited rather than
produce), the model suggests that it would have been optimal for the L-1011 to have exited
in 1985. However, the distinction between the two years is essentially a technical one. By
1985 Lockheed had ceased to produce the L-1011. The two aircraft sales that were made
reﬂected unsold inventory from the previous year. The model also suggests that the DC-10
should have technically exited one year prior to its actual exit in 1990, but again in this case
the one aircraft sale that took place in 1989 reﬂected the remaining inventory from the year
prior.
8 Representative Twenty-Year Simulation
This section will use a typical twenty period industry simulation to display several important
features of the model simulations. Figures 5-8 describe a typical 20 year model simulation
with initial condition as above, i.e., a market with one large 747-style plane. During this
period, ve rms are observed, the initial large plane (rm 1), three small plane entrants,
and one medium sized entrant (rm 4). Firm 3, which is a small sized plane, enters in period
4 and exits in period 8. The remaining rms remain active at the end of the simulation
period.
This simulation shows three major points. The rst is that, according to the model, prices
generally do not reﬂect costs. Cost curves follow a standard looking learning curve (despite
the presence of forgetting in the cost function) and thus cost varies over a wide range. Prices,
on the other hand, are relatively constant to changes in the market. The rst three entrants
have slightly higher initial prices due to the fact that they have fewer rival rms, and more
importantly, no rivals that have reached the bottom of their learning curves. However, once











































































































37the industry reaches maturity, rm 4 and especially rm 5 enter with essentially their long
run product price.
The second point exhibited by the simulations is that prot realizations have very high
variance in this model. Firm 3 makes losses in every period that it operates from the time that
it enters (see Figure 8). In that sense, this rm is reminiscent of the L-1011 and particularly
the price versus average-variable-cost graph shown in the beginning of the paper. The model
tells us that in expectation it is optimal for the rm to enter and it is optimal for it to remain
in the market for all ve years. It happens that, despite acting in an optimal manner, this
rm receives bad market realizations which cause it to make large losses totaling about $6
billion dollars. In hindsight and without an intimate knowledge of the industry the rm's
actions may appear to have been suboptimal, but the model tells us that this is not the case.
A third point is also exhibited particularly well by Figure 8 and that is that rms always
start out by losing money in early periods, even net of development costs. In most cases,
rms go on to make prots in future periods, though often (45%) these prots are not large
enough to make the program an overall success. See, for example, rm 5 in the simulation.
It should be noted that the shape of the cash ﬂow curves in Figure 8 looks remarkably like
cash ﬂow charts published by aircraft industry rms. Firms in the model generally reach
protability within 10-15 years if they are going to at all. This feature is also very consistent
with industry norms.
9 Industry Performance: Alternative Market Structures
In this section, the base market structure (MPE) is compared with two alternatives: a multi-
product monopolist (M) and a multi-product social planner (SP). To accomplish this com-
parison it was necessary to calculate a new equilibrium under each of the two alternative
market structures using the same parameters as in the base model. The primary dierence
to the model is that in each case there is now only one optimizing agent. Therefore, for each
of the two alternatives there is a unique value function and associated policy function and the
38Table 7: Invariant Distribution Under Alternative Market Structures
Market Structure: Social-Planner MPE Monopolist
Concentration Ratios:
1-Plane 0.68 0.40 0.98
(S.D.) 0.18 0.15 0.08
2-Plane 0.94 0.69 1.0
(S.D.) 0.09 0.11 0.0
Market Size:
#F i r m s 2.4 3.8 1.03
(S.D.) 0.4 0.4 0.03
Avg. Quantity Per Period:
small 91 174 69
medium 120 51 21
large 129 6 0.3
Avg. Price Per Unit:
small 47.6 66.1 89.5
medium 61.8 81.6 104.1
large 83.2 105.4 127.4
Avg. MC Per Unit:
small Lowest=47.3 48.9 50.5 49.2
medium Lowest=61.6 63.3 65.5 64.1
large Lowest=83.1 84.7 86.2 89.6
Avg. (Price/MC): 0.94 1.24 1.76
(Avg. Price)/(Avg. TC): 0.95 1.19 1.66
EDV of New Product Investment:
Mean 25011 38940 6800
(S.D.) 8404 10227 4499
EDV of Consumer Surplus:
Mean 209353 135325 73526
(S.D.) 12840 6957 7171
Min 171585 110286 43307
Max 243133 152224 89919
EDV of Producer Surplus:
Mean -14966 42363 61374
(S.D.) 2094 3754 5237
Min -22550 30704 35207
Max -8299 52668 74820
EDV of Total Surplus:
Mean 194387 177689 134337
(S.D.) 12434 10333 12144
Min 153563 142133 78514
Max 228081 204182 163767 39Table 8: Distribution of Gain Under Alternative Market Structures
Distribution of Gain for: SP over MPE SP over M MPE over M
Consumer Surplus Gain:
Mean 74026 135826 61800
(S.D.) 9276 12076 8446
Min 38825 101103 34707
Max 102943 172481 91294
%P o s . 100% 100% 100%
Producer Surplus Gain:
Mean -57329 -75777 -18448
(S.D.) 4408 5623 5423
Min -70598 -91154 -34277
Max -42687 -46760 3176
%P o s . 0% 0% 0.3%
Total Surplus Gain:
Mean 16698 60049 43352
(S.D.) 8465 13478 13301
Min -20936 19033 1701
Max 44358 105097 93620
%P o s . 96% 100% 100%
Mean Consumer Gain: 55% 187% 86%
Mean Producer Gain: -136% -125% -30%
Mean Total Gain: 9.4% 46% 33%
40solution algorithm is a contraction mapping. Tables 7 and 8 show statistics for the invariant
distribution of under each of the three market structures.
According to the simulations, the MPE is quite ecient from a social perspective. On average,
the social planner increases total surplus by just 9% ($17 Billion) over the MPE. However,
consumers are a great deal better o and producers a great deal worse o with the social
planner. The monopolist, on the other hand, provides much lower social welfare than either
the social planner or the MPE, at great expense to consumers.
While the social planner does have the lowest production costs on average, surprisingly the
welfare improvements from the social planner are not driven primarily by lower marginal costs
through learning as suggested by the theoretical models. All three market structures lead to
fairly ecient production. Instead, welfare gains under the social planner result primarily
from more standard sources. The social planner sets price approximately equal to marginal
cost and produces about 40% more total output per period on average than the competitive
rms. The competitive rms in turn produce about 2.5 times as much total output as the
monopolist.
The second area of welfare savings under the social planner results from concentrating output
among just 2.3 rms on average, as compared with 3.8 in the competitive case, which leads to
approximately a 40% reduction in new product investment. It seems that in the competitive
case there is excess investment in development of new planes and wasted investment in
learning to produce these products eciently. Thus, while marginal costs and prices are
lowest on average under the social planner, concentration ratios are higher than in the MPE
case.
10 Policy Experiment: Restricting Concentration
In a recent article, The New York Times referred to Boeing as \essentially a government-
sanctioned monopoly". Theoretically, there is reason to believe that high concentration may
41be socially benecial in industries with strong learning curves. In the absence of perfect spill-
overs of experience between rms, it is always cost-minimizing to concentrate production
as much as possible. However, the standard welfare reducing eects of monopoly are also
present: in an unconstrained monopoly there tend to be fewer products and lower total
production, both of which reduce welfare.
An advantage to having such a detailed model is that it becomes possible to evaluate which
eect will dominate in this particular industry, and hence to determine whether the current
policy is the correct one. Specically, I consider alternative anti-trust policies under which
rms are punished if they become \too large" as measured by the industry one-rm concen-
tration ratio (a per se restriction on concentration as considered in Dasgupta and Stiglitz
(1988)). Under such a policy no single rm will choose to produce more than a certain per-
centage of the aircraft sold in a given year. Note that with the policy in place equilibrium
strategies dier from those described above. Firms know that the policy exists and therefore,
since the policy changes payos in certain states, equilibrium strategies must also change.
Thus, in order to evaluate alternative policies it was necessary to re-solve the model for a
new equilibrium in each case.26
Table 9 lists some summary statistics drawn from industry simulations under the base case (no
restriction) and two alternative policies. Simulations were initiated at the observed industry
structure for 1994 and use identical random draws for each policy. The experiment is thus
analogous to implementation of the given policy alternative beginning in that year. Figures
reported are present discounted values from 1000 simulations of 100 periods each.
Table 9 shows that the impact of the two alternative policies on the predicted distribution
of concentration ratios is only slight. In that sense, the concentration restriction policy is
somewhat unsuccessful in that its eect seems to be largely limited to those states in which
26It was also necessary to make an assumption about what occurs in states where there is outright monopoly,
since at these states the one-rm concentration ratio would always be one. In this case I assumed that the
rm would be a regulated monopolist and must set price equal to marginal cost, but would be reimbursed
for its xed costs. Thus in monopoly states the rm makes zero current prot (and consumers benet). Note
that in equilibrium such states are only reached 0.01% of the time so the exact assumption made is irrelevant
to the results.
42Table 9: Statistics from 1000 Industry Simulations Under Alternative Policies
Invariant Distribution
Maximum Concentration: 100% 60% 51%
Concentration Ratios:
1-Firm/Plane 0.40 0.40 0.40
(S.D.) 0.10 0.09 0.08
2-Firm/Plane 0.70 0.70 0.70
(S.D.) 0.11 0.11 0.11
Consumer Surplus:
Mean 135326 134899 133927
(S.D.) 6957 7235 7428
Min 110286 102774 99164
Max 152224 152521 153024
Producer Surplus:
Mean 42363 42351 42364
(S.D.) 3754 3790 3780
Min 30704 30078 30702
Max 52668 52691 52502
Total Surplus:
Mean 177689 177250 176291
(S.D.) 10333 10597 10747
Min 142133 135772 132253
Max 204182 204096 205060
43Table 10: Distribution of Harm Under Alternative Policies


















%P o s . 94% 92%
Mean Consumer Harm: 0.3% 1.1%
Mean Producer Harm: 0.0% 0.0%
Mean Total Harm: 0.3% 0.8%
44the policy actually binds, without having too great an impact on other states. Table 9
also shows that the consumer and producer surplus distributions are lower the stronger the
policy alternative. However, dierences are quite small compared with the variance in these
distributions making it dicult to conclude how harmful the policies are.
Table 10 lists the distribution of welfare gains/losses across the 1000 simulations, making it
clear that welfare losses are in fact systematic. Both policies reduce consumer surplus and
total surplus in over 90% of the simulations. Mean total harm in the 51% policy is 0.8%, or
$1.4 Billion in present value terms. While the eect is fairly small relative to its standard
deviation of $2.4 Billion, again conrming that the policy is not binding in many states, these
results ought to be indicative of what might occur if such a policy was instituted in a market
with multi-product rms.
The concentration restriction primarily binds in states where one rm has high quality and
low cost and the others do not. In these states, the primary eect of the policy is to restrict
the dominant rm's output. Within the period, the negative eects of the policy are rather
straightforward since reduced sales by the dominant rm tend to lower consumer surplus.
However, there is also an opposing positive eect in that the policy causes weaker rms to
react by increasing their output. These two within-period eects also have dynamic implica-
tions since the dominant rm is less likely to remain a low-cost producer while weaker rms
are more likely to move down their learning curves. The evidence in Table 10 suggests that
once all eects are accounted for, both alternative policies lead to welfare losses overall.
The distributional eects of the policy are somewhat complicated by the stochastic nature
of the dynamics in the model (which reﬂect the industry itself). In spite of the fact that
welfare losses occur in over 90% of the simulations and that losses are quite large in some
cases, in one case the 60% policy improves total welfare by approximately 7% ($13 Billion).
The reason for this outcome is quite complex. There are certain sequences in which the
rm that is dominant in the market at the start of the simulations receives bad draws on
quality very early, while smaller rms simultaneously receive good ones. In such sequences, a
government policy which hurts this dominant rm in early periods and helps smaller ones is
45welfare enhancing. Of course there is no way that any government could possibly foresee this
occurrence. Moreover, there exist sequences where the opposite occurs and a concentration
restriction can result in as much as a 17% ($11 Billion) welfare loss. The conclusion that a
concentration restriction would be welfare reducing thus holds only in expectation. As noted
in Table 10, approximately 6-8% of the time such a policy would increase welfare. This result
is quite intuitive and underscores the richness of the overall model.
It is also interesting that according to the surplus gures in Table 10 producers as a whole
should be more indierent to this policy than consumers since it hurts them very little on
average. This result may at rst seem counter-intuitive since anti-trust policy is usually
thought of as pro-consumer. However, due to the presence of learning curves, concentrating
production lowers cost far enough that consumers may actually experience lower prices in
situations where concentration is high. Furthermore the conclusion that the policy does not
harm producers does not account for the fact that the distribution of the policy's eects is
highly skewed. All producer losses from the policy in any given period are experienced by
only one rm. Thus, if such a policy were proposed, according to the model we should expect
consumers (airlines) and the dominant rm to oppose this policy and weaker competing rms
to support it.
Finally, note that in evaluating this policy we have kept rms' investment in product quality,
which is modeled in reduced form, xed. In actuality, since the concentration restriction
reduces producer surplus in high quality states, investment in quality would likely fall on
average under the policy. In that case, since producers do not account for the social benet
of increased investment, it also seems likely that further harm would result from the policy,
so that the results actually represent a lower bound to the harm distribution.
11 Conclusions
This paper represents a rst attempt at building an empirical dynamic equilibrium model of
an industry with learning by doing. It is also a rst attempt at constructing an empirical
46multi-agent model that generates prices and quantities endogenously in dynamic equilibrium.
Despite many simplifying assumptions, the model predicts many aspects of the historical
data well, particularly the periodic pricing of aircraft below the level of static marginal cost.
The model also replicates many aspects of observed industry dynamics, including entry, exit,
concentration ratios, plane value, and plane type distributions.
While computation of the model equilibria has proven to be quite computationally intensive,
the evidence presented here provides tentative support for the use of this class of dynamic
models in empirical work more generally. This is an important nding since in the past anal-
ysis has been dicult, if not impossible, in industries where dynamics play an important role.
Indeed, despite many important policy implications, to my knowledge noone has undertaken
such a detailed analysis of the aircraft industry previously, primarily due to the intractability
of the problem.
At the same time, the aircraft industry is one of the simpler cases to work with because
the small number of rms and products in the industry provide some relief from the curse
of dimensionality. Given the great computational burden of modeling even a small industry
such as this one, the outlook may at rst seem grim with respect to tackling larger problems.
However, there are extensions to the general class of multi-agent dynamic models used here
that would allow application to other more complex and higher dimensional industries. Such
extensions include modeling several dominant rms individually and treating remaining rms
as acting together through one combined agent. In many industries where there are only a
few leading rms and a large number of \fringe" rms, such an assumption would not be
unreasonable.
Having such a detailed model is a great advantage because it is well-suited to analyzing
various policies by simply re-solving the model with alternative institutions in place. I have
evaluated three alternative market structures, with results suggesting that the single-product
MPE is on average quite ecient from a social perspective. I also evaluated a policy which
would restrict one-rm concentration in the aircraft industry, with the conclusion that such
47a policy would reduce total welfare with high probability. Both of these policy evaluations
suggest caution with respect to government intervention in the aircraft industry. However,
the model also suggests that an uncontested monopolist producer would lead to a large loss
in social eciency, an outcome which should be avoided if possible.
With some simple extensions, the model could also be extended to look at other anti-trust
alternatives such as the break-up of a multi-product rm, regulation strategies, and various
strategic trade policies, all of which are of current relevance in the commercial aircraft indus-
try. With some further extensions, such as the explicit modeling of the rm's investment in
product quality, the eects of R&D subsidies could also be considered. None of these types
of policy simulations would be possible without a fully specied model.
48A Discretized Experience Process
Dene et to be the experience state number for a given rm at time t, and discretize experience
into seven points:
E[] = f1;10;20;40;70;110;165g
Thus et can take on values in the range [1::7], and Et = E[et]. These seven points characterize
approximately the observed range of experience in the data. Experience was discretized at
closer intervals for low levels of experience because cost changes more quickly when experience
is low.
As described in the text, experience is assumed to evolve as follows:
Et = Et−1 + qt−1 and E1 = 1 (11)
However, equation (11) describes a deterministic continuous process that I need to transform
into a stochastic discrete process for the purposes of the dynamic model.
To accomplish this, I rst calculate Et from Et−1 and qt−1 using (11). Then, I compare Et to
the discretized points E[] to see what range it falls in. Dene ed and eu to be the two closest
discretized points such that E[ed]  Et  E[eu]. Then the distribution of et given et−1 and












Hence, in theory, et communicates with all other values of e, but in equilibrium it only
communicates with two: ed and eu.
49A.1 Deterministic vs Stochastic Experience Evolution
The cost function estimates from Benkard (2000) assume a deterministic progression for
experience. However, it seems more likely that in reality experience evolves stochastically,
i.e. when you build a plane, sometimes you learn and sometimes you do not. Hence, the
stochastic progression of experience used in the industry model may in fact be more realistic
than a deterministic one.
Moreover, re-estimating the model from Benkard (2000) under the assumption that expe-
rience follows a stochastic process does not change the results. Without looking at further
implications of the stochastic model, such as the fact that it predicts greater variance in expe-
rience as time goes on, it is not possible for the data to distinguish which model is the correct
one. Thus, assuming stochastic evolution of experience in the industry model is justied.
A.2 Discrete vs Continuous Experience
Assuming that experience must make large discrete movements rather than small continuous
ones has the eect of convexifying the value function within these ranges. Where the integral
of the value function would otherwise be a smooth function of quantity, it now is essentially
piecewise linear, with a quantity derivative that makes a nite number of discrete jumps.
The main impact of these discrete jumps on the dynamic model is that, in the maximization
process, rms frequently optimally choose to produce a quantity level that puts them at a
certain level of experience with probability one. This result arises because the marginal loss
from increasing quantity is smooth while the marginal benet is piecewise linear as described
above. Hence the point of equality (or tangency) often occurs at a cusp, where the derivative
of the marginal benet is undened.
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